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External sources (not reviewed)

Recognizing with satisfaction that, in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Conference undertook to make determined efforts towards the achievement of the goal of universality of the Treaty, called upon those remaining States not

(c) If these fissile materials are mixed with

Action 15 of the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons states that “[…] the Conference on Disarmament should, within the context of an agreed, comprehensive and balanced programme of work, immediately begin negotiations of a treaty banning the

Consistent with its obligation not to provide source or special fissionable material, or equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material to any non-nuclearweapon State for peaceful purposes unless the source or special fissionable material is subject to IAEA safeguards, and with decision 2, paragraph 12, of the 1995 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review and Extension Conference, with the exception of India, Canada will only authorize nuclear cooperation involving proliferationsignificant items with those non-nuclear-weapon States that have made an internationally legally

The latest Declaration by the Heads of CSTO member States, adopted on 10 December 2010 in Moscow, notes that the Organization attaches the highest priority to strengthening the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the swift entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the prevention of nuclear terrorism and the development of

That programme is the best basis for making progress towards negotiations on a treaty prohibiting the

At its sixty-fourth session, in 2009, the General Assembly urged the Conference on Disarmament to agree early in 2010 on a programme of work that includes the immediate commencement of negotiations on a

Enrichment facilities would be required to declare that

The Rio Group urges all members of the Conference to demonstrate the political will necessary to ensure the start, without delay, of its substantive work through the adoption and implementation of a balanced and comprehensive programme of work that moves the nuclear disarmament agenda forward, including negotiations on a nuclear weapons convention, a universal, unconditional and legally binding instrument on negative security assurances for non-nuclear-weapon States, the prevention of an arms race in outer space and a multilateral and

This should be set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with IAEA in accordance with the Treaty and the IAEA statute, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of the obligations of nuclear-weapon States, with a view to providing baseline data for future disarmament and

Moreover, the provision by certain exporting States of technical assistance on nuclear issues to non-States parties indicated the existence of double standards and was in contravention with the Treaty and decision 2 adopted at the 1995 Review and Extension Conference, which stipulated that new supply arrangements for the transfer of nuclear materials should require acceptance of the Agency’s full-scope

Cuba supports the adoption of a programme of work in the Conference on Disarmament, and has said on various occasions that it is prepared to negotiate in parallel a treaty which eliminates and prohibits nuclear weapons, a treaty prohibiting the arms race in outer space, a treaty providing effective security assurances for States which, like Cuba, do not possess nuclear weapons,

Measures to be taken in this context include the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty; the conclusion of a multilateral internationally verifiable treaty banning the

The serious concerns of Canada about the possible military dimensions of the nuclear programme of the Islamic Republic of Iran were reinforced by the November 2011 report of IAEA, in which the Agency noted that the Islamic Republic of Iran “has

This is why we call upon all States possessing nuclear weapons to declare

The Conference notes that the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty reaffirmed their commitment not to receive the transfer

The Conference urges all States parties to ensure that their nuclear-related exports do not directly or

Articles I, II and III comprise the non-proliferation obligations of all Treaty parties by prohibiting

Lastly, the 1995 NPT Review Conference decision that “new supply arrangements for the transfer of source or special fissionable material or equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material to non-nuclear-weapon States should require, as a necessary precondition, acceptance of the Agency’s full-scope safeguards and

Emphasizing the basic provisions of the above-mentioned resolutions, which call upon all parties directly concerned to consider taking the practical and urgent steps required for the implementation of the proposal to establish a nuclear-weaponfree zone in the region of the Middle East and, pending and during the establishment of such a zone, to declare solemnly that they will refrain, on a reciprocal basis, from producing, acquiring or in any other

The Conference calls upon India, Israel and Pakistan to accede to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States, promptly and without conditions, thereby accepting an internationally legally

The Conference reconfirms paragraph 12 of decision 2 (“Principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament”) of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which provides that new supply arrangements for the transfer of source or special fissionable material or equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material to non-nuclear-weapon States should require, as a necessary precondition, acceptance of the full-scope IAEA

Under article 1 of the agreement, Rwanda, as a State party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, committed itself to accepting safeguards on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the

To reaffirm their commitment not to

Article I of the Treaty by not transferring to Israel

In addition, the Criminal Code provides for criminal liability for the transfer across the State customs border of

Regarding items to be covered, the United Kingdom agrees that the scope of the treaty should include all conventional weapons, including, at a minimum, manned or unmanned weapons; tanks; other military vehicles; artillery systems; military aircraft and helicopters; surface and submarine naval vessels armed or equipped for military use; missiles and missile systems, guided or