agency costs

This study focuses on the point of view of agency costs to examine the interaction of accounting conservatism and managerial incentive.

Furthermore, this study finds that the characteristics of agency costs are different from the types of ultimate controlling shareholders.

Cross-shareholding among companies can cause agency costs of the shareholders' separating control from cash-flow Rights.

Transparency and accountability are seen as inherently linked, and secrecy is considered by many to produce large agency costs.

Through hostile takeover the agency costs can be reduced by replacing the inept executives.

Intra-corporate agency costs vary in accordance with the varying ownership concentration degree.

This Note thus attempts to provide a larger conceptual toolkit for thinking about ways to reduce agency costs in government.

Reasonable salary incentives can improve the efficiency of senior executives, and reduce agency costs.

Board of Directors is the core of corporate governance structure, which plays an important role in decreasing agency costs.

Mainly discusses the basis of directors' compensation from the control of agency costs and ownership structure.

Based on the theory of agency costs, this article analyzes the relation between managers' compensation and corporate diversification.

Finally, we concluded that leagues of minor stockholders can effectively mitigate agency costs.

Should such agency costs be handled by means other than criminal prosecutions and jail terms?

The results show that the effect of unexpected cash holdings on company value is dependent on the agency costs.

How to reduce agency costs, and solve the agency problem has become one of the hot issues.

This paper studies the first class of equity agency costs on firm performance.

To the extent that there is a gap in this alignment, agency costs will accrue.

that is, situations where agency costs of free cash flows are likely to be high.

Agency costs can also arise in financing.

And management equity incentive plan that is held in order to solve the agents' moral hazard problem arising from agency costs.

So this paper selects independent directors and managers' shareholding these two variables to study the impact of agency costs.

Banks, whose high proportion shareholder is the nation, can decrease the rate of the national shareholding to cut the agency costs;

Listed companies; equity agency costs; company performance; Empirical analysis;

Ownership Structure; Equity agency costs; Listed Companies; Equity Management;

Studies show that through share ownership's balance degree, banks can effectively reduce the agency costs;

Reward contract and agency costs on comparative performance information

An Empirical Analysis on Product Market Competition, Agency Costs and Agency Efficiency

An Empirical Analysis of Influence on Agency Costs from Holding Proportion of Large Shareholders

On the Demonstration Analysis of Stock-right Structure Influencing Agency Costs

The Design of Efficient Incentives Mechanism and the Analysis of Agency Costs for Human Resource under Layoff

A Study on Corporate Bond Maturity: Perspective from Transaction Costs and Agency Costs

The Analysis of Incentive and Supervision Mechanism of Firms and Their Agency Costs

Asset Sales, Firm Performance and the Agency Costs of Managerial Discretion

Agency Costs of Engineering Procurement

Effects of Controlling Shareholders Agency on Debt Financing Agency Costs -Analysis based on Real Options

The Nature of Control Rights, Agency Costs and the Efficiency of Governance Mechanisms

The Incentive Mechanism Design of Firms and the Analysis of Agency Costs

The implications of cash holdings on agency costs